main thrust of the tide, though with many currents and eddies, is the insight that if, in the light of the law-fact pattern of the case at bar, only one state is likely to have to live with the long-range social consequences of applying one competing rule rather than another, it is that state's rule that should be applied.
Torts conflicts problems are not, however, always so easily solved. The purposes underlying the competing rules, what social evil they strive to ameliorate or what good encourage, may be difficult to discern with sufficient assurance to map the proper territorial scope of those purposes. Moreover, even if the policies and their legitimate reach are known, not one, but two or perhaps more states may be seen to have a rational, not officious, claim to the application of their own rules in furtherance of their own goals. How are these more difficult conflicts problems to be solved? It is to this question that courts and scholars are addressing themselves. In this article I will discuss the recent efforts of two great courts to resolve difficult choice-of-law problems -the "rules" approach taken by the New York Court of Appeals 2 and the "comparative impairment" technique adopted by the California Supreme Court. 3 I will then, in the light of that discussion, offer my own "rules" for resolving torts conflicts problems. centering on the question of whether a guest's right to recover against his New York host driver is to be determined by the ordinary negligence standard of New York or by a heightened degree of wrongdoing, such as "gross negligence," required for recovery by a "guest statute" of another jurisdiction. The struggle of the Court with these cases has been awesome to behold -dissents, shifting doctrine, results not easily reconcilable. In short, a law professor's delight but a practitioner's and judge's nightmare. It is quite understandable, then, that weary from this struggle, a. majority of the Court felt that the time had come to inject a measure of predictability into New York conflicts doctrine that had been absent since New York discarded the placeof-wrong rule.
Neumeier 7. The railroad urged application of the Ontario "gross negligence" standard to determine the New York driver's liability because if it applied, the railroad would be insulated from that portion of the damages attributable to the fault of the New York driver. ONT. REv. STAT. c. 296, § 2(2) (1970).
8. 31 N.Y.2d at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70: 1. When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the same state, and the car is there registered, the law of that state should control and determine the standard of care which the host owes to his guest.
2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and that state does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he should not be held liable by reason of the fact that liability would be imposed upon him under the tort law of the state of the [Vol. 41 : No. 2 henceforth be used in resolving conflicts cases involving the liability of a host driver to his guest. These rules were quoted from Judge Fuld's concurring opinion in a prior case. 9 Rule 1 states that if the host and guest are domiciled in the same state and the car is also registered there, the law of that state determines the standard of care that the host owes the guest.
Rule 2 focuses on the situation in which the host resides in a state that has a guest statute and the guest resides in a state that does not have a guest statute. Under these circumstances, if the host's conduct occurs in the host's state then the host should not be liable under the law of the guest's state, but if the host injures the guest in the guest's state, the driver should not "in the albsence of special circumstances" be entitled to the protection of the guest statute of his own state.' 0 Rule 3 is addressed to other situations when the host and the guest are domiciled in different states. In these circumstances the Court will "normally" apply the law of the state where the accident occurred unless applying a different rule "will advance the relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state system or producing great uncertainty for litigants."" 1 The Court held that Neumeier fell under Rule 3, that the exception to normal application of the law of the place of accident was not applicable, and that therefore the Canadian statute was applicable. The most obvious question concerning this rule is why, as between host and guest, 13 it makes any difference where the car is registered. Suppose two victim's domicile. Conversely, when the guest was injured in the state of his own domicile and its law permits recovery, the driver who has come into that state should not-in the absence of special circumstances-be permitted to interpose the law of his state as a defense.
3. In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are domiciled in different states, the rule is necessarily less categorical. Normally, the applicable rule of decision will be that of the state where the accident occurred but not if it can be shown that displacing that normally applicable rule will advance the relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state system or producing great uncertainty for litigants. For a suggestion that this conflict be solved by applying the guest statute to bar any claim by the guest against the host, but permitting the driver of the other car to obtain indemnity from the host to the extent that the other driver pays more than half the verdict, see Weintraub Applying the law of the place of accident produces a result that at least is defensible in most circumstances; but suppose that the trip during which the accident occurs is one that has touched or is intended to touch on both states. Do we really want the result to depend on which side of the state line the car happened to be on when the guest was injured?
21 Would this case fall under the cryptic "special circumstances" exception in the rule? Alas, that exception is addressed only to the proposition that the driver will not always be subjected to the ordinary negligence rule of the guest's state when he injures the guest there. Perhaps in our hypothetical involving driving in both states we could interpret the first words of the rule-"when the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile"-to mean "all of his conduct, actual and intended, during the events preceding the injury".
Rule 3: Apply the law of the place of accident in other situations in which host and guest are domiciled in different states.
The Court holds that Neumeier does not fall within the vague exception articulated at the end of the rule. This result raises the question when the exception will apply and, despite Chief Judge Fuld's disclaimer, invites the accusation of invidious discrimination against guests who are unlucky enough not to live in New York. The Court of Appeals' quest for conflicts rules is understandable. Given the complexity that is possible in the new conflicts analysis, a court may well wish to avoid treating every conflicts case as a new problem to be analyzed from scratch.
3 0 The safest way to implement a rules approach is to wait until the court has decided a variety of cases focusing on the same choice-of-law problem. If the results of these cases can be succinctly and clearly summarized," this summary of the pattern of decided cases can provide "rules" to guide the court, lower courts, and attorneys. When, however, a rule articulated by a court purports to be broader than the pattern of already decided cases, this is a more hazardous undertaking. At the very least, the court should think through the fact patterns that are likely to occur in future cases and see whether in those situations it would desire the result dictated by the new rules.
This process of stating a rule to cover yet undecided fact situations and doing so in a manner that the court is reasonably sure will not prove embar- "reckless operation".
28. The Court did decide that, in the light of Colorado opinions applying the Colorado statute, it could not be said as a matter of law that the trial court erred in leaving the question of whether the host's conduct was "willful and wanton" to the jury. The Court remitted the case to the Appellate Division for a review of the facts. The Appellate Division had reversed the judgment against the driver and dismissed the complaint.
29 One of the difficulties with Neumeier and Labree is that they are "unprovided" 3 5 or "no interest" cases. The classic "no interest" case is one in which the plaintiff's state has a law favorable to the defendant and the defendant's state has a law favorable to the plaintiff. The term "no interest" comes from the argument that neither state is interested in having its own law apply. The plaintiff's state has no interest in protecting the defendant who comes from another state and the defendant's state has no reason to give the plaintiff more compensation than he would get under the law of his own state.
Perhaps wrongful death action was brought against the driver of the car in which the decedent was a passenger and against the owner of the parked automobile. Both defendants were California residents. Under the law of the Mexican state in which the decedent was domiciled at the time of his death, a maximum recovery of just under $2,000 was available. California placed no monetary limit on recovery. The California Supreme Court held that the California measure of recovery for wrongful death should apply.
Hurtado contains a factual distinction from both Neumeier and Labree-a distinction on which the California Supreme Court focused. In Hurtado, the California defendants performed their allegedly negligent acts in California. The Court saw deterrence of negligent conduct as one of the reasons for California's rule of full compensation for wrongful death. This deterrence policy was applicable when a California resident acted tortiously in California.
Is Hurtado's deterrence argument cogent? If a California driver does not drive carefully because of fear for his own safety, or for fear of the safety of his loved ones and friends who are passengers, or for fear of the sanctions of criminal law, is he likely to be made a more careful driver by the specter of California's unlimited recovery? Perhaps the effect of an accident on the cost and availability of liability insurance is some incentive for more prudent driving.
3 7 There is very little empirical data that throws light upon the question of whether a combination of civil liability and insurance practices deters careless driving. 38 If such a proposition ever is established, I for one would find it counterintuitive.
3 9 In the meantime, I would prefer a more compelling When asked to select which alternative they would mind less in a series of all possible pairings of four undesirable consequences, the drivers showed their preferences from least undesirable to most undesirable to be:
(1) A $250 accident with no injuries (selected on 70% of 606 binary choices).
(2) An accident with minor personal injury (selected 56%). One tempting basis for resolving the "unprovided" case is to fall back upon the core legal concepts that are common to both jurisdictions. Both states have a general background of liability for wrongful conduct. The rule of the plaintiff's state limiting that liability is an exception to the general rule of liability-an exception that is not applicable if its sole purpose is to protect defendants resident in that state or in states with similar rules. If the exception is not applicable, the rule-liability-is and this is then the common result under the law of both states. 40 The difficulty with this "common core" basis for resolving no-interest cases is that there is danger of begging the question by attaching one label rather than another. Why is it not just as accurate to say that the background rule is no liability for conduct unless there is a rule specifically imposing liability? 41 This objection seems especially appropriate when addressed to liability for wrongful death in the light of the great differences in compensable losses and methods of computing damages that exist even between states of the United States. 42 There are times when the "common core" concept may be especially attractive. For example, one could argue with some force that all states have a policy of validating wills and that if a state has a particular invalidating rule, which in the light of its underlying policies is not applicable to the law-fact pattern in litigation, the common policy of validation should prevail. But this kind of argument should be used with great caution to avoid illogical leaps to results that are desired for unarticulated reasons.
Another way of deciding the "unprovided" case is to re-examine the tentative conculsion that neither state has a policy that will be advanced by applying its law. By finding a deterrence policy, the court in Hurtado converted a "no interest" case into a "false conflict" in which California had an interest in imposing liability but the Mexican state had no interest whatever in preventing full liability. In the same manner, it would be possible to reanalyze both Neumeier and Labree and defend the result in each as the only sensible resolution of a false conflict. In Neumeier, the New York Court of Appeals suggested that although New York has no interest in giving an Ontario citizen recovery not available under Ontario law, Ontario certainly has an interest in seeing to it that its citizens behave graciously in Ontario and do not manifest their inery by a small number of nonresidents from restrictive-recovery states would not significantly diminish the local deterrent effect. gratitude by extracting compensation from hosts who are only ordinarily negligent. 43 On the other hand, the Labree result could be defended on the basis of the "altruism" policy articulated in that opinion: a state has an interest in having its drivers bear the primary responsibility for distributing the cost of their injurious conduct no matter where this conduct occurs or who is injured by that conduct.
The question then becomes which of the policies articulated to resolve the "unprovided" cases, Neumeier, Labree, and Hurtado, is the most credible. I vote 
A. Bernhard v. Harrah's Club
The opposite of the "no interest" case is the "true conflict" in which each of two or more states would have its policy advanced by having its law, rather than the different rule of another state, applied to the case being decided. A recent California Supreme Court decision deals with the true conflict problem in a noteworthy manner.
In Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 4 5 a California plaintiff was injured when his motorcycle collided in California with an automobile driven by another California resident. The automobile driver had become intoxicated at a Nevada gambling establishment from which she was driving home. The Nevada club advertised in California and solicited the business of California residents. Under Nevada law, service of liquor to a drunk person does not render the server civilly liable for harm caused by the drunk. Under California law, service of intoxicating beverages to a person obviously intoxicated is regarded as a proximate cause of injury resulting from the drunk's conduct and the server is liable.
The California Supreme Court recognized that both Nevada and California were interested in having their own rules applied. Nevada wished to protect the bar owner from civil liability because that was Nevada's policy and the defendant was a Nevada corporation that served the beverages in Nevada. California wished to "prevent tavern keepers from selling alcoholic beverages to obviously intoxicated persons who are likely to act in California in the intoxicated state.
'46 The Court resolved this dilemma in favor of application of the California rule making the bar owner civilly liable. The method adopted by the Court to do this is to measure the "comparative impairment" 47 of the policies of the two states if the law of the other state were applied. The Court found that California's interest in protecting its residents would be very seriously impaired if California law did not reach out-of-state tavern keepers who, like defendant, regularly and purposefully sell intoxicating beverages to Wis. L. REv. 495, 510. If the California policy were simply to provide an additional and probably solvent defendant for the victim to sue, comparative impairment analysis should require the Court to determine whether the driver's assets, including insurance coverage, were sufficient to compensate plaintiff without looking to the Nevada club. See text accompanying notes 53-55 infra.
California residents in places and under conditions in which it is reasonably certain these residents will return to California and act in California while still intoxicated. The Court found, however, that Nevada's interest in protecting its tavern keepers would not be significantly impaired when, as in the instant case, liability is imposed only on tavern keepers who actively solicit California business. Moreover, the Court reasoned, since the act of selling alcoholic beverages to obviously intoxicated persons is already a crime in Nevada, the application of California's rule of civil liability will not impose an entirely new duty on Nevada bar owners requiring the ability to distinguish between California residents and other patrons.
I do not find this reasoning cogent. The most obvious difficulty is that the Court failed to note that the Nevada statute imposing criminal sanctions for serving liquor to inebriated persons had been repealed after the accident but almost three years before the opinion. 48 Unless the Court is issuing a one-trip ticket, it is imposing on Nevada bartenders a new duty. The Court suggests that relatively few Nevada tavern keepers will be affected. In the absence of empirical data, is there any reason not to believe that relatively few Californians injured in California would be affected if the decision had gone the other way? 49 One can certainly imagine a Nevada court applying what purports to be exactly the same method of analysis and coming to the opposite conclusion. 50 Unless supplemented by specific objective criteria, "comparative impairment" is unlikely to be a method that is cogent, feasible to administer, and predictable.
B. Objective Bases for a "Comparative Impairment" Method
What are such specific objective criteria? A convincing argument can be made that a state's policies will be unimpaired when its law is not applied if the law in issue does not in fact advance the policies on which it purports to be based. 51 For example, it can be contended that a guest statute does not prevent collusive suits or shield hosts from ungrateful guests. In the absence of clear empirical verification, however, such a route is very hazardous. It should be traveled, if at all, with great caution.
52
Another objective basis for comparing policy impairment is to determine whether the policies advanced by the laws of one state are eliminated or 48. 1973 68 (9th Cir. 1975 ). In Hanley, the choice was between the libel rules of California (newspaper incorporated and published) and Nevada (plaintiff's domicile where some papers circulated). California law required the plaintiff to allege special damages unless retraction of the libel was demanded and not forthcoming. At the time of publication, Nevada law did not require that special damages be pleaded. The court applied Nevada law as of the time of publication even though the Nevada rule had since been changed to conform to the California law.
57. This definition of "objective anachronism" might be enlarged to include an aberrant plaintiff-favoring rule. A plaintiff-favoring rule is "aberrant" if adopted by one or very few states and sufficient time has passed to make it clear that more states are unlikely to adopt the rule.
58. See " a New York resident was operated on in a Boston hospital by a world-renowned Boston surgeon. The plaintiff died after the surgery and a wrongful death action was brought in New York against the doctor and the hospital. At the time of the death, Massachusetts limited recovery to $50,000, but New York had no limit. A majority of the court held that the Massachusetts limit was not applicable and justified the result in part on the basis of the interstate nature of the transaction-the Massachusetts hospital and the famous surgeon treated patients from all over the world.
Schwartz v. Consolidated Freightways Corporation 6 0 raises the nexus problem in an extreme form. The plaintiff, a Minnesota resident, was driving a truck in Indiana when he was involved in a three-truck collision. Both of the other trucks were garaged and maintained in Ohio. The plaintiff went back to Minnesota and there sued the two corporations that owned the two trucks with which he had collided in Indiana. The only connection between the defendants and Minnesota that the court mentions is stated as follows: "[B]oth defendant corporations, although foreign to Minnesota, are licensed to do business in this state, and presumably exercise this privilege.
'6 ' The court nevertheless held that the Minnesota comparative negligence rule was applicable rather than the Indiana contributory negligence rule, which would have completely barred recovery by the Minnesota plaintiff.
It The easiest choice-of-law rule to apply is one that is result oriented rather than territorially oriented. There may be reasonable debate concerning which state has the "most significant relationship" 70 or will have its policies least impaired, but not about which rule is most favorable to the plaintiff. If there is, let the plaintiff choose. The question is whether there is any sound policy basis for a plaintiff-favoring conflicts rule in torts. There is because recovery, with loss-distribution through the tortfeasor's liability insurance, represents the most pervasive aspect of tort developments in this country over the past several decades. 71 It makes sense to have a choice-of-law rule in accord with widely shared and clearly discernible trends in the domestic laws whose conflicts we are trying to resolve. But this result-orientation should be only a presumption. The elements that will rebut this presumption in a particular case should be clearly stated. Objective anachronism 72 is one obvious rebutting element. It is rare today that a plaintiff-favoring tort rule will be anachronistic, but perhaps, for example, actions for alienation of affections qualify. 73 It may be that soon, with the growth of first-party no-fault insurance, a wide range of actions against alleged tortfeasors for personal injury will be consigned to the dustbin of history. Another rebutting element is that imposition of liability under a plaintiff-favoring rule must be under circumstances that will be perceived as fair in the light of the defendant's activities. These are the conclusions that I draw from the prior sections of this article. The following choice-of-law rules for torts are intended to incorporate these concepts. I harbor no delusion that even if these rules were widely adopted, torts conflicts cases would overnight become ministerial child's play-nor would I wish to foster mechanical and unthinking decision making. I do believe that these rules point the court to the right questions and are feasible to administer. It would be possible, but not easy, to argue on both sides of Neumeier and Bernhard under these rules. I would decide Neumeier under my rule 3 and reach the result opposite that reached by the New York Court of Appeals. But if that Court were truly convinced that Ontario wished to deter ingratitude of Ontario guests, even dead ones, and that New York had no policy of making its drivers responsible cost distributors no matter whom they injured, then the same result in fact reached could be reached under rule 1. Under rule 2, I would reach the same result as was reached in Bernhard. But it could be argued that California lacked sufficient nexus with defendant to make that result reasonable. With the crash site approximately sixty miles from the club, however, that argument is difficult to make with a straight face. No, the results to be reached under these rules are not ineluctable-just, I hope, sensible and with clearly articulated bases for decision. 74 . It is very unlikely that lack of nexus with defendant will be a major factor in the nointerest case. The classic example of such a case is one in which the defendant's domicile has the law favoring the plaintiff.
